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By Democratic Audit
Having security chiefs give evidence to Parliament is
progress, but future sessions must dig deeper
Last week was the first time that the heads of Britain’s security services have appeared in public in front of the
newly reformed Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC). Andrew Defty argues that although the session
was in and of itself significant, in future the ISC members must  exert a greater degree of scrutiny if the
committee is to be an effective check on the security services. 
The signif icance of
last week’s
appearance of
intelligence agency heads bef ore the parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), f ar
outweighed anything that actually emerged f rom the evidence session itself . The ISC, which was
established in 1994, has until this point met entirely in secret. Its membership was appointed by the Prime
Minister and its reports are subject to scrutiny and excisions in the Cabinet Of f ice bef ore publication.
Recent ref orms under the Justice and Security Act, which enhanced the powers of  the ISC and
reconstituted it as a committee of  parliament, were designed in part, to present the committee as a more
powerf ul and independent investigator. As such, this f irst public evidence session was as much a test f or
the ISC as it was f or those appearing bef ore it.
The ISC has been crit icised in the past f or being too close to the agencies, and f or the unchallenging
nature of  its reports. Last week’s evidence session was a f airly anodyne af f air, which did litt le to relieve
those concerns. Witnesses appearing bef ore parliamentary select committees are not usually given a
platf orm to make broad statements in support of  their posit ion, and those who attempt to do so are
generally cut short by select committee Chairs. The ISC’s treatment of  the heads of  Britain’s three
intelligence and security agencies was somewhat dif f erent. The witnesses were asked a series of  broad
open questions, which invited broad and at t imes predictable responses. They were asked, f or example, to
comment on the nature of  the threat f acing Britain today, what impact new technology had on their work,
and whether they f elt the agencies they represented were too powerf ul and of f ered good value f or money.
Some of  the questions were clearly designed to allow the agency heads to make prepared statements
dispelling popular myths about their work. It is hardly tenable, f or example, that Sir Malcolm Rif kind really
believes that GCHQ collects inf ormation on ‘the majority of  the public’ but his suggestion that they did,
allowed the head of  GCHQ to ref ute the notion. Julian Lewis’s question about whether everyone was still
spying on everyone else, invited a similarly short and predictable denial. A more illuminating approach might
have been to ask about what distinction, if  any, the agencies make between hostile and f riendly powers.
Hazel Blears went somewhat f urther then her colleagues in making the case f or the agencies, telling them
that in seeking to balance the needs of  privacy and security they were clearly between ‘a rock and a hard
place’, which may well be the case, but it would have been more appropriate if  the witnesses, rather than a
member of  the committee, had made the point. When she later added that most of  the public seemed to
support the agencies and that some would like them to be given more powers, she was interrupted by the
Chair, who clarif ied that this was ‘not necessarily the view of  this committee.’
It is, nevertheless, important to remember that this was the ISC’s f irst public session and rather than
providing a snapshot of  the committee’s day-to-day work, much of  the questioning was clearly designed to
draw out contextual inf ormation f or the benef it of  the watching public. However, the concern will be that the
questions are no more taxing when the committee meets in private. It would have been helpf ul if  the ISC had
pushed a litt le f urther, and at least identif ied more of  those areas about which it will be seeking answers in
private session. As it was, the only area in which the agency heads were f orced to say that they would
pref er to give more details in closed session, related to the manner in which terrorists had benef itted f rom
recent newspaper revelations about the work of  GCHQ. This was also the part of  their evidence which
received most widespread coverage in subsequent media reports.
There was, nevertheless, some interesting material in this session. The most signif icant comments related
to oversight and control. What was clear, and probably is under-appreciated more widely, was the extent to
which the agencies are aware of  the legal f ramework within which they operate. Andrew Parker, the head of
MI5, reminded the committee that the legislative mandate of  the agencies is drawn directly f rom the
European Convention on Human Rights, while GCHQ head, Sir Iain Lobban, in response to a question
about whether the legislation had kept pace with technological developments, emphasised that the
f undamental principles of  necessity and proportionality, were not af f ected by technological change. Lobban
also ref erred several t imes to the value of  the Commissioners who oversee the issue of  warrants to
intercept communications and enter property. Litt le is known about the work of  the Commissioners, but on
the basis of  the evidence presented here, in addition to overseeing the warranting procedure, they also
appear to be providing ongoing legal guidance on surveillance methods, which suggests a role more akin to
that of  legal counsel or inspectors general, which are used widely in the US intelligence community.
Perhaps the most interesting evidence related to the sharing of  intelligence with states who may use it in
the interrogation and torture of  terrorist suspects. The head of  SIS, Sir John Sawers, suggested that in
such circumstances ‘we seek clear assurances that when we provide intelligence, it will be used lawf ully and
that if  anybody is detained or questioned…it is done to our standards.’ Yet the ISC’s own investigation into
rendition in 2007 revealed that there are signif icant problems in establishing the veracity of  such
assurances, even when provided by partner countries, such as the United States. It is a shame that this
was not f ollowed up by the committee last week. Another area previously examined by the ISC was the
interrogation of  terrorist suspects by Brit ish personnel abroad, which was the subject of  an ISC report in
2005.
Interestingly, in his evidence last week Sawers conceded that at that t ime the training and guidance f or
Brit ish personnel were not suf f icient to provide ‘clear direction to us, as heads of  Agencies, and to our
staf f  in the f ield about what they can and cannot do.’ This somewhat contradicts assurances given to the
ISC in 2005 both by SIS and MI5, that in relation to interrogation techniques their ‘general ethics,
methodology and training’ was sound. While Sawers was quick to assert that ‘rigorous compliance
procedures’ are now in place, including with new guidance approved by the ISC, admissions about
def iciencies in the relatively recent past, and questions about the ISC’s ability to ef f ectively hold the
agencies to account f or them, have the potential to damage conf idence both in the agencies and the
committee.
The witnesses all emphasised that in their view there was no need f or more legislative restraint, but they
also made it clear that this was a question f or the polit icians and that they would work within whatever
limits were placed upon them. This apparent def erence to polit ical control perhaps underestimates the
inf luence these powerf ul individuals have over the polit ical agenda. It would be unusual f or a Government to
seek to introduce f urther restraints against their advice.  Moreover, by making these statements in public,
the agency heads have provided ammunition f or those, including within Parliament, who would seek to block
f urther changes to the legislative f ramework within which they operate.
As this suggests, there are dangers if  these evidence sessions are simply allowed to become a platf orm
f or the agencies, and it is to be hoped that f uture sessions become more routine and more robust. As such
they may serve to build conf idence which will benef it the agencies and enhance the credibility of  the ISC.
Whatever the f laws, this was an important step f orward in terms of  accountability both f or the intelligence
agencies, and the ISC, and it will be interesting to see how it develops.
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